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Although widely analyzed by authors and theoretically valued by the public, the right to
health data conﬁdentiality seems to be more of an academic ﬁgure than a real protected
right. This happens due to intrinsic problems with the practical enforcement of some
patient’s rights, but is getting more notorious in contemporary society.
This article describes the rights to health data privacy and conﬁdentiality in their classical
contours, focusing on areas of consensus and controversy and analyzing the recent trans-
formations in society that are causing a crisis in these same rights. We  agree that there are
reasons to believe that there are no novel legal instruments in Health Law to redeem these
rights, except for European Data Protection Law. Here, we brieﬂy analyze the new European
data  protection draft regulation, which intends to bring reinforced tools on this domain.
We  conclude that the juridical aura that still embraces the right to medical and genetic
data  conﬁdentiality in Health Law and Bioethics seems to no longer have a practical sense.
However, despite this perception, the essential dimension of individual freedom relating to
personal information and to the notion that the less is known about us the freer we  all are is
still very relevant and so Health Law needs to dedicate more attention to the transformations
of  privacy and conﬁdentiality in the medical and genetic ﬁelds in order to maintain them
protected and respected.
© 2014 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights
reserved.
Direito  à  vida  privada  e  à  conﬁdencialidade  de  dados  de  saúde:  crise  ou
redenc¸ão?
r  e  s  u  m  ote analisado pelos autores e teoricamente valorizado pelo público, oalavras-chave: Apesar de amplamen
ireito à vida privada
ireito à conﬁdencialidade
ados de saúde
direito à conﬁdencialidade dos dados de saúde parece ser mais de uma ﬁgura académica do
que  um direito realmente protegido. Tal acontece devido a alguns problemas intrínsecos na
aplicac¸ão prática de alguns dos direitos dos doentes, mas torna-se cada vez mais notório
nas  sociedades contemporâneas.
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Protec¸ão e seguranc¸a de dados
de saúde
Direitos dos doentes
Direito europeu da protec¸ão de
dados
Este artigo descreve, em primeiro lugar, os direitos à vida privada e à conﬁdencialidade
de  dados de saúde nos seus contornos clássicos, mostrando as áreas de consenso e con-
trovérsias em torno deles. Em segundo lugar, analisam-se as recentes transformac¸ões na
sociedade que estão a causar uma crise nesses mesmos direitos, sendo esta capaz de os
transformar ou mesmo de os eliminar como direitos dos doentes verdadeiramente respeita-
dos. Neste capítulo, constata-se que há fortes sinais para acreditar que no Direito da Saúde
e  na Bioética os direitos à vida privada e à conﬁdencialidade estão a sofrer uma crise e
que não se têm criado quaisquer instrumentos legais inovadores em Direito da Saúde para
os  resgatar, ao contrário do que acontece no Direito Europeu de Protecc¸ão de Dados. Esta
premissa leva à terceira parte do artigo, onde se analisam brevemente a proposta do novo
regulamento europeu de protec¸ão de dados pessoais, cada vez mais perto de ser publicado,
o  qual pretende trazer ferramentas reforc¸adas neste domínio.
Conclui-se que a aura jurídica que ainda envolve os direitos à conﬁdencialidade dos
dados médicos e genéticos em Direito da Saúde e Bioética não parece ter já um sentido
prático, sendo quase como promover um produto com enorme potencial mas  que não existe
no  mercado. A única área que ainda se move na frente de defesa da vida privada e da
conﬁdencialidade de dados pessoais na nossa sociedade é o direito europeu de protec¸ão
de  dados. No entanto, mesmo que este facto apresente novas tendências legais que podem
ajudar a dar aos direitos dos doentes à vida privada e à conﬁdencialidade dos seus dados
um  pouco mais de forc¸a, pensamos que, apesar das medidas europeias inovadoras, o Direito
da Saúde precisa de se dedicar mais a produzir um novo pensamento jurídico operacional
para que os direitos à vida privada e à conﬁdencialidade nos futuros cenários da Medicina
e  da Genética continuem a ser respeitados.
© 2014 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. Todos os
to privacy sprouts from the notion that throughout life every
person moves within juridical spaces with varying degrees of
liberty.5,a Such spaces can be broadly grouped into two  main
a Jonathan Franzen refers to this matter in page 43 of his very
acute essay on privacy, called “Imperial Bedroom”: “What really
undergirds privacy is the classical liberal conception of personal
autonomy or liberty. In the last few decades, many judges andIntroduction
“Issues of privacy have become entangled with bioinfor-
matics as, increasingly; we  rely on technology rather than
on human beings to resolve privacy issues.”1(p6)
“New technologies upheave old norms, and new norms
need to be negotiated: a process that takes time.”2(p125)
Preliminary  note
Although we are aware that the topic of this article is not
novel, we  think that it still needs attention as continuous
transformations in society are constantly bringing new facts
that reﬂect upon the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality
as patient’s rights either in healthcare or medical research
settings.
Baring this premise in mind, this paper aims to discuss the
classical concepts of the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality
in health versus the recent development and solidiﬁcation of a
permanent “reality show” society which trivializes the disclo-
sure and the dissemination of personal data, including health
data. More  and more  people adhere to free information and are
ignorant or reluctant to data protection principles until they
suffer considerable consequences. Nevertheless, litigation
regarding the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality of health
data is rare. As some authors put it “the (. . .)  issue of medical
3conﬁdentiality has been more  discussed than litigated.”
There is an ample Health Law and Bioethics literature on
the importance of the right to conﬁdentiality of medical and
genetic data, which is considered a fundamental patient rightdireitos reservados.
and is enshrined in the Law of several countries. This right is
also one of the main data protection rights. Importantly, med-
ical and genetic data are considered exceptionally sensitive
data by current Data Protection Laws, which is a special status
requiring extra security and conﬁdentiality protection meas-
ures. The reason for this special status is that medical and
genetic data are considered to belong to the “private” sphere
of the person (data subject), as they relate to the most intimate
personal areas. Hence, an unauthorized disclosure of this data
is potentially meant to cause discrimination and stigmatiza-
tion in the personal, professional or social life domains of the
data subject. Concurrently, health data privacy is also a very
important tool in Public Health policies (e.g. for the acceptance
and success of name-based surveillance).4
From  the  Hippocratic  Oath,  to  the  right  to  be  forgotten
The duty of conﬁdentiality is a medical deontological pillar
since the Hippocratic Oath, dating back to the 5th century
BC. On the other hand, the right to privacy is a relatively
recent juridical concept. The classical conception of the rightscholars have chosen to speak of a “zone of privacy” rather than a
“zone of liberty”, but this is a shift in emphasis, not in substance:
not the making of a new doctrine but the repackaging of an old
one”.
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reas, a public and a private sphere. When we  move within
ur public sphere whatever we do, say or choose can be consid-
red public information in a way that no restrictions are placed
o its diffusion and dissemination. In parallel, inside our pri-
ate sphere, special care must be exercised in order to restrict
ccess and sharing of information so that special limits, which
re deﬁned by the individual, are not crossed unless a very
igniﬁcant public interest is at stake. The right to privacy is in
hat sense a “personality right”6,b rooted in the need to respect
he autonomy of people and aimed at protecting them from
arm.7 The concession to every human being of an individual
rivate space is deeply connected with values such as free-
om and self-determination. Certainly, the borders between
ublic and private spheres vary signiﬁcantly depending on
istorical and sociological contexts, political conditions and
ven personal and individual representations of reality. It has
een more  than 120 years since Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
randeis8 wrote “The Right to Privacy” an inﬂuential Harvard
aw Review article drawing attention to the need of protec-
ion against the invasion of privacy. In this article, the authors
eﬁned the concept of privacy protection by adapting a famous
xpression of judge Thomas Cooley (regarding tort injury) as
(. . .)  an instance of the enforcement of the more  general right
f the individual to be let alone”.8
The premonitory signiﬁcance of this article and the
ncreasing difﬁculty and necessity to ﬁnd the correct measures
o protect privacy in an age of fast-paced technology-driven
rogress are well acknowledged. In fact, just about one hun-
red years after Warren and Brandeis, in a persuasive 1998
ew Yorker essay titled “Imperial Bedroom”, Jonathan Franzen
epicted privacy as “(. . .)  espoused as the most fundamental
f rights, marketed as the most desirable of commodities, and
ronounced dead twice a week”.5 Interestingly, in “Imperial
edroom” Franzen also quoted Richard Powers’ deﬁnition of
he private aspects of the self as “(. . .)  that part of life that
oes unregistered”.5
These quotes reﬂect the present state of the right to pri-
acy, which was born out of a world that had just discovered
he wonders and perils of the telephone or photography and
oday is threatened by our technology-swamped lives. We
oncede that the challenges that technology poses to the
ight to privacy and conﬁdentiality are many  and that society
as evolved in ways that seem to contradict the almost
evered importance that these rights once had. However,
uch challenges do not necessarily correspond to oblivion of
hese rights. Evidence has shown that regarding health and
enetic data, the protection of these rights is still a priority
or patients and physicians.7,9,c Furthermore, it is the main
oncern of the public regarding the donations of their own
iological material to biobanks.10 These facts suggests that
b This is the category of rights in which the Portuguese Consti-
ution includes the right to privacy (article 26). See for all Moreira
nd Canotilho, Constituic¸ão da República Portuguesa, articles 1◦
o 107◦.
c Despite the reduced number of court actions against profes-
ionals who did not disclose genetic risk to relatives of their
atients there is reluctance from physicians and genetic coun-
elors to breach conﬁdentiality. 0 1 4;3 2(2):123–133 125
privacy and conﬁdentiality are still valued concepts by most
people and therefore did not lose all their practical sense.
Some of these factors, which explain a diminishing value of
the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality, were generally iden-
tiﬁed by the European Commission as a basis for the ongoing
reform of data protection in the European Union (EU).11 In
this article we highlight the efforts on new data protection
mechanisms, which have been developed by the European
Commission (EC) and coined in the draft of a new data protec-
tion regulation,d as a good example of conﬁdentiality rights
resilience.11 We analyze this new legal turn in data protection
in the EU and make some considerations on its relevance for
the conﬁdentiality of personal health data. In brief, the new
regulation will give more  power to customers of online ser-
vices, determine stronger safeguards for EU citizens’ data that
gets transmitted abroad, and considerably increase ﬁnes on
companies that breach the law. Importantly, in the regulation
draft, health data are still considered “particularly sensitive
and vulnerable in relation to fundamental rights or privacy”
deserving “speciﬁc protection”.11
We  also examine the new “right to be forgotten” which is
also enacted in the already mentioned regulation draft on data
protection and was recognized by the Court of Justice of the
European Union on May 2014 in the Google Spain SL, Google Inc.
vs Agencia Espan˜ola de Protección de Datos case.12
In brief, this article aims mainly to summarize the issues
and questions raised in the health data protection ﬁeld, rather
than to provide any solutions. Nonetheless, bearing the new
European Law developments in mind, this article ends with
our last word on the status quo of privacy and conﬁdentiality
of personal health data rights.
State  of  the  art
The  rights  to  privacy  and  conﬁdentiality
The right to conﬁdentiality is based on the fundamental rights
to privacy and to “informational self-determination”, which
relate to personal data protection (data protection rights).
However, conﬁdentiality is a different concept than privacy,
and it comprises more  than data protection rights. Firstly,
conﬁdentiality works downstream of privacy and for conﬁ-
dentiality to be legally “triggered”, privacy must have already
been disclosed.13 Furthermore, on one hand the right to pri-
vacy is what is called a “negative” right because it claims
non-interference with information belonging to the private
sphere. On the other hand, conﬁdentiality is both a “negative”
and a “positive” right as it similarly claims non-interference or
silence (e.g. in the form of professional secrecy) but also prac-
tical protective actions (e.g. security measures; supervision;
sanctions – see Fig. 1).
Historically, understanding the real meaning and the limits
of the right to conﬁdentiality can be better achieved by taking
d Regulations are the strongest European Union normative
instruments entering in force in all member States as soon as they
are published in the Ofﬁcial Journal of the Communities. They dif-
fer  from “directives”, which need to be transposed to the member
States internal legal order.
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Confidentiality V. Privacy
Privacy sphere
Direct disclosure (doctor)
Professional
secrecy
Security
measures
Supervision
sanctions
Indirect disclosure (biobank)
Medical-genetic
information Secret information
Confidentiality
ersuFig. 1 – Conﬁdentiality v
a look at the 1988 English tort law case Attorney General v. The
Observer Ltd.14 This case covered the publication in several
British newspapers of excerpts from the controversial book
Spycatcher, written by former MI5  counterintelligence ofﬁcer
Peter Wright. The book, at the time already published in the
USA and Australia but not in England, contained details about
Wright’s activity in MI5, which constituted a violation of an Act
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom – the Ofﬁcial Secrets
Act 1991 – protecting state secrets and ofﬁcial information.
In his argument in the House of Lords, Lord Goff of Chieveley
identiﬁed a vital dimension of the right to conﬁdentiality –
the duty of conﬁdence. According to Lord Goff of Chieveley,
this duty “(. . .) arises when conﬁdential information comes to
the knowledge of a person (the conﬁdant), with the effect that
(. . .) he should be precluded from disclosing the information
to others”.14 Therefore, he concludes “(. . .)  there is such a
public interest in the maintenance of conﬁdences, that the
law will provide remedies for their protection”.11 Importantly,
Attorney General v. The Observer Ltd. also permitted to identify
the limits to the right to conﬁdentiality. First, the right to
conﬁdentiality only applies to conﬁdential information and
not to information that has already entered the public domain
(information for which there is general access). Second, the
right to conﬁdentiality does not apply to trivial information.
Third, and perhaps most signiﬁcantly, the public interest of
conﬁdence protection must be balanced in the face of other
public interests. In this regard, Lord Goff of Chieveley declared
that “(. . .)  it is this limiting principle which may require a
court to carry out a balancing operation, weighing the public
interest in maintaining conﬁdence against a countervailing
public interest favoring disclosure”.14
As Attorney General v. The Observer Ltd. so well illustrates,
the most controversial part of the right/duty of conﬁdential-
ity is the zone where this right has to be balanced with other
conﬂicting public interests. In fact, this zone of conﬂict has
been the subject of intense study in the ﬁelds of Health Law
and Ethics mainly in the domain of HIV infection (probably
the most controversial) and, particularly, in the related ten-
sion between the duty of professional/medical secrecy and the
duty to disclose personal health information for the purposes
of protecting a third party’s health or life. Importantly, recent
advances in genomics and the possibility to deﬁne someone’s
future risk of developing a disease by analyzing hereditarys privacy of health data.
genetic information feeds into the same discussion and illus-
trates that this debate is very much alive in our time.15
Understanding the tension between the right to/duty of
conﬁdentiality and public interest must also be informed by
a closer look at different deﬁnitions of the latter. Public inter-
est is an open and ever evolving concept. Many would argue
that no matter the extent to which the concept evolves and
transforms, public interest should never be allowed to be
confused with curiosity or voyeurism and that exaggerated
broadening of some deﬁnitions of public interest would, ulti-
mately, end up emptying the notion of private information,
turning it into trivia, and defeating the purpose of recogniz-
ing a right to conﬁdentiality with balanced limits. On  the
other hand, others argue that we are moving towards a broad
notion of public interest that would, most of the times, favor
disclosure of information. According to this notion the alter-
native public interest related to protecting conﬁdence looks
increasingly more  like a private interest. No matter which side
we take on this argument, it is important to balance public
interest with conﬁdentiality and identify and discuss relevant
factors leading to a possible fading or transmutation of the
latter.
The rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality are nowadays
entangled with the right to the protection of personal data,
which is established by Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the EU,16 Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU),17 and in Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).18 As underlined in 2010
by the Court of Justice of the EU in the joined cases Volker und
Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen,19 the right
to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right, but
must be considered in relation to its function in society. Data
protection is closely linked to the respect for private and family
life protected by Article 7 of the Charter.16 This is reﬂected by
Article 1(1) of Directive 95/46/EC20 which provides that Mem-
ber States shall protect fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons and in particular their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data.
Whatever happens in the data protection law ﬁeld will
affect tremendously the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality
in the health law domain. This is why the ongoing reform in
European data protection legal instruments is so important
to discuss here. In a 2012 document preceding the draft of the
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ew EU regulation, with the suggestive title of Safeguarding Pri-
acy in a Connected World – A European Data Protection Framework
or the 21st Century,21 the European Commission undoubtedly
hows that the protection of privacy and conﬁdentiality rights
s the core of data protection law. This document identiﬁes
s the major challenge for today’s data protection, the new
ays of sharing information, through social networks and
emote storage of large amounts of data, which “have become
art of life for many  of Europe’s 250 million internet users”.21
evertheless, it stresses very clearly that “in this new digi-
al environment, individuals have the right to enjoy effective
ontrol over their personal information”.21
In a way, we think that, at present, data protection law is
he “practical” or “feasible” part of the defense of the rights
o privacy and conﬁdentiality of health information. This is
articularly so as nowadays, the compliance with these rights
ssentially depends almost totally on the existence of very
bjective security measures in healthcare information tech-
ologies (IT). For instance, the concept of “privacy by design”
rought up by the EU data protection reform and also included
n the draft of the new regulation,11,e if adopted in healthcare
nits could be the key to prevent breaches of conﬁdentiality
from scratch”. However, the costs and technical implications
f these measures may be dissuasive, particularly if sanc-
ions for not complying with data protection measures are
ot strong enough or if control by the competent authorities
s inexistent.
Nowadays, personal health data are stored and accessed in
ifferent systems, sometimes independently of secrecy duties.
n other cases, such data can even be stored in the Cloud,
lthough this practice is considered to be inadvisable by data
rotection commissioners. Hence, it is obvious that in order
o protect the right to conﬁdentiality in contemporary soci-
ties and healthcare units, information technology systems
ust provide the appropriate mechanisms to avoid illegiti-
ate breaches of patient’s data. A very important corollary of
his is that conﬁdentiality became expensive to protect and, as
uch, it may come to be more  of a “luxury” to health manage-
ent than a basic necessity. This tendency may even be more
cute for the health care systems in an inverted demographic
yramid world.
onsensual  and  defying  ideas
he interconnected rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality
egarding medical and genetic information have been amply
iscussed in the Bioethics and Health Law ﬁelds and have been
he object of consensual and defying ideas. In the ﬁrst group,
t is indisputable that as a centenary medical duty, the duty of
edical secrecy is still key to the medical business. Without
he perception that physicians are bound by a duty of medical
ecrecy, certainly most patients would not disclose some of
heir intimate clinical history. Furthermore, it is important to
ighlight the consensual notion that the right to conﬁdential-
ty in health works not only to preserve a signiﬁcant element
f trust, which is of vital importance in most interactions in
e See section 2 on Data Security, article 30/3 (security of
rocessing) of the regulation draft. 0 1 4;3 2(2):123–133 127
the healthcare context, but also to prevent stigmatization and
defend against discrimination. Therefore, conﬁdentiality pro-
tection measures are valuable public health allies, not only in
the history of epidemics as already mentioned above4 but also
in relatively new areas, such as public health genomics (e.g.
without trust in the conﬁdentiality of biobanks for research
purposes, people are not willing to donate their DNA10).
However, relevant as they may be, the traditional con-
cepts of privacy and conﬁdentiality have been signiﬁcantly
deﬁed. The ﬁrst noteworthy example is that of the famous
1982 New England Journal of Medicine article by Mark Siegler,22
which denounced the excessive number of people accessing
medical records in hospitals, leading to the characteriza-
tion of conﬁdentiality in medicine as a “decrepit concept”.22
Twenty years after, an extensive literature review by Pamela
Sankar and colleagues illustrated a general unawareness or
misunderstanding of the ethical and legal right to medi-
cal conﬁdentiality by patients, which prompted the authors
to label the concept as both “over and underestimated”.23
Notably, widespread confusion (and in some cases ignorance)
about conﬁdentiality and its relevance in the biomedical arena
is thought to be inﬂuenced by the inexistence of a clear, precise
and harmonized deﬁnition of what constitutes “conﬁdential
data”. This imprecision has led some authors to portray con-
ﬁdentiality as a “Tour of Babel”.24
In addition to the aforementioned issues on a lack of
clear deﬁnitions of “conﬁdential data” and privacy bound-
aries, recent trends in the context of genetics (for example in
the context of biobanking) provide novel challenges to health
privacy. The advancement of technology and its impact in
molecular biology research also brought agitation and stress
to the concepts of privacy and conﬁdentiality. In summary,
can these concepts survive in the form of a duty of genetic
conﬁdentiality and genetic privacy rights? Let us look at the
example of biobanking. In biobanks there is no “privileged”
relationship3 between the scientists on one side and the
research participants on the other, contrarily to what hap-
pens in the patient-physician biomedical relationship. This
contrast necessarily begs the need of a redeﬁnition of the legal
basis in which personal information is shared and protected
in biobanks. In face of these new challenges, the necessary
departure from classical notions is sometimes so signiﬁcant
that some authors consider that concepts cannot bend that
far without being irreparably broken and therefore wonder
whether conﬁdentiality is now but an obsolete concept.25
To close this brief presentation of defying ideas on health
and genetic data privacy and conﬁdentiality we  should
mention the issue of anonymization of human biological
materials (HBMs). In reality, biobanking activities pose pri-
vacy and conﬁdentiality obstacles that at ﬁrst glance seem to
be surpassed if the concept of conﬁdentiality is redeﬁned and
reconﬁgured, moving on from a trust-based model of infor-
mation secrecy, towards an anonymized-data model.26 The
pre-requisite would be that anonymization would become a
core requirement to build a biobank. However, anonymization
of HBMs poses several questions, which endanger this appar-
27ent solution. Quoting Mariachiara Tallacchini” the rationale
behind this model is based on the assumption that the
de-identiﬁcation of the human biological materials (HBMs)
cancel their “subjective traceability”, i.e.  the characteristics
b l i c a128  r e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú 
that render them re-identiﬁable, and that this is “the tech-
nical ﬁlter which guarantees data conﬁdentiality” (by using
different methods of encrypting the sensitive information).27
Nonetheless, the same author interestingly suggests that
there are areas of doubt in the validity of this “guarantee”.
Firstly, by stating that “the expression ‘anonymization of data’
often conceals situations in which, in fact, the possibility
of reidentifying data still exists, and, therefore, in which
anonymity is neither real nor complete” (. . .). Secondly, and
perhaps more  critically, by considering anonymity as “the
rhetorical strategy for denying the existence of any subjective
interest in HBMs and, consequently, for afﬁrming their free
availability to those who may make interesting use of them:
the biotech industry”.27
In summary, the aforementioned consensual and defying
ideas clearly illustrate how the ﬁeld of health and genetic
data privacy and conﬁdentiality rights is a very complex legal
ground, which claims for more  dedicated attention from aca-
demics in the ﬁeld of Health Law.
Factors  that  are  transforming  health  data  privacy  and
conﬁdentiality
The progressive erosion of our own private spheres2 is now
contributing to the growth and expansion of a global pub-
lic sphere we  all share. Privacy concessions can be observed
everywhere and have multiple causes and aims. Security, for
example, is the prominent cause for disclosure of private
data. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States
of America, privacy concessions based on security reasons
were greatly expanded.28 Concomitantly, intrusions in our
private spheres such as airport screening, collection of ﬁn-
gerprints and photographs and extensive video surveillance
are now widely accepted and perceived as normal practice.
Remarkably, people are not only tolerating privacy conces-
sions for shared purposes such as common security but also
increasingly opting to give away privacy for individual gains,
such as fame, money and recognition. TV shows and social
phenomena where people linger on other’s most intimate
moments such as precise ﬁrst-hand accounts of deeply trau-
matic experiences (including health-related conditions) have
gained signiﬁcant notoriety. The case of Jade Goody, a 27 year-
old British Big Brother participant is an extreme example of
exposure of terminal illness in the media. Goody raised around
£1 m from media deals signed since she was told she had ter-
minal cervical cancer. Her main reason to sign these contracts
for a live coverage of her ﬁnal days was to leave the money to
her children.fIn Portugal, very recently, Manuel Forjaz, a well-known and
charismatic academic famously shared writings and photos
on social media about the progression of his cancer, including
f See newspaper articles “Jade Goody to wed and die ‘in the pub-
lic  eye’ The reality TV star will sell media rights to raise money for
her  children” (The Observer, Sunday 15 February 2009) Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2009/feb/15/jade-goody-
cancer) and “Jade Goody set to make £1 m from media deals” (the-
guardian.com, Wednesday 18 February 2009 12.33, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/feb/18/jade-goody-
wedding-deals). . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):123–133
chemotherapy sessions, its secondary effects and consequent
suffering. During this period he participated in a weekly TV
show and spoke regularly and openly in public about his
disease. He died a few days after publishing a book about
his shared experience as a cancer patient.29 These situa-
tions illustrate the possible transformation of the nature
of health data from a paradigm of secrecy made of a cer-
tain “embarrassment”,3 into a possible future paradigm of
openness. Overall, health data are becoming socially accept-
able information and its self-disclosure is becoming trivial.
However, this tendency certainly does not suit everyone as dif-
ferent people have very different notions of what they want
to keep private. Still, the paradigm may be changing, and it
would be at least doubtful if someone who shared his or her
health condition on social media could subsequently try to sue
those who decided to share that information outside the circle
within which that information was originally shared. Hence,
in a world where health information too becomes widely
shared on social networks, society can relativize the rights to
medical and genetic privacy and conﬁdentiality, which may
ultimately pervade law and justice.
Trivialization of the sharing of formerly considered “sen-
sitive data” is also becoming more  acute due to the almost
impossible task that is required of data protection authori-
ties to control the multitude of health data, which is currently
being collected. On the other hand, building systems that
secure conﬁdentiality is sometimes considered a luxury,
which is neglected by health administrators, particularly in
countries where ﬁnancial crises have led to austerity meas-
ures (e.g. Portugal). In the case of Portugal, the absence
of systematic supervision and sanctions by data protection
authorities, which struggle with lack of means, together
with the almost inexistent litigation in this domain, result
in random privacy or conﬁdentiality protection concerns in
healthcare units. As a consequence, anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that it is possible for administrative staff to access
patients’ medical histories, in violation of national law. Unsur-
prisingly, in countries where social welfare is jeopardized,
patients prioritize access to care over any other rights and are
less prone to complain of cases involving a violation of privacy
and conﬁdentiality rights.
Genetic  privacy  and  conﬁdentiality
Notably, this erosion of health data privacy and conﬁdential-
ity ﬁnds parallel in more  speciﬁc phenomena in the areas
of genetics and genomics. Here again, privacy concessions
are motivated by public and private interest alike. As we
know, the Human Genome Project (HGP) and the advent of
genomics have highlighted (or at least promised) the impor-
tance of genetic data in ﬁghting disease and improving health
outcomes. For example, different Public Health ﬁelds, such
as infectious and chronic disease, occupational health and
environmental health can advantage from the progress of
genomics and the sharing of genetic data, leading to what has
been described by some authors as “Genetic information for
30all” syndrome. This subject and the related issue of person-
alized medicine (where therapy is speciﬁcally designed to an
individual based on his/hers genetic proﬁle) have deep privacy
and conﬁdentiality implications. First and foremost, we  must
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onsider whether our genetic information can contribute to
igniﬁcant conclusions about our risks of developing future
iseases. If that is established, at least at a reasonable level,
enetic data need to be considered as private as any other
ealth data. Nevertheless, it is clear that if someone carries a
enetic alteration that has been associated with a signiﬁcant
nd elevated risk of developing a disease in the future, that
nformation could be useful to family members who might
hare that same alteration. Despite the fact that different stud-
es show that the overwhelming majority of patients choose
o pass information of genetic risk and genetic disease to fam-
ly members, in some cases sharing information collides both
ith the patients’ will and the right of family members not
o know.31,32 Hence, in pondering whether or not to share
enetic data with family members, the probability that the
isease will develop and the magnitude of the harm should
hat disease indeed develop must be balanced and weighted
gainst the costs (individual and public) of breaching conﬁ-
entiality duties.13 Hence, clearly, the advances in genetics
nd genomics pose signiﬁcant challenges to privacy and con-
dentiality too.
Finally, a supplementary note to mention that, in line with
he aforementioned security concerns and therefore perhaps
nsurprisingly, in some cases it is already accepted to give
way genetic privacy for justice reasons. For example, the UK
ational DNA database already includes DNA proﬁles of more
han 3 million individuals, covering more  than 6% of the pop-
lation and raising privacy and conﬁdentiality issues amongst
ther innumerous bioethics and human rights questions.33–35
he topic of genetic privacy and biobanks for forensic pur-
oses, however, will not be debated here as it goes beyond the
cope of this article.
he  European  Data  Protection  Law  reform:  the
edemption  of  health  data  privacy  and
onﬁdentiality  rights?
reliminary  note
n the previous sections we identiﬁed reasons to believe that
he rights to health data privacy and conﬁdentiality – once
o cherished in Health Law – are suffering a crisis. This cri-
is is caused not only by general societal phenomena but
lso by speciﬁc factors related to the ﬁelds of healthcare
nd genomics. We  also mentioned that we consider data
rotection law as the “practical” or “feasible” part of the
efense of the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality of health
nformation as, currently, the compliance with these rights
ssentially depends on security measures and information
echnology (IT). Hence, we  agree that whatever happens in
he data protection law ﬁeld will have a signiﬁcant impact
n the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality in the health law
omain. Considering that European Data Protection Law has
een recently subject to a considerable reform, including a
ew European regulation draft, it is very important to ana-
yze it here, although not in detail, as this does not ﬁt exactly
he scope of this article, which is oriented to Health Law and 0 1 4;3 2(2):123–133 129
Bioethics and not to Data Protection Law issues, which other
authors have discussed elsewhere.36,37
The  EU  reform  of  the  data  protection  legal  framework
“Rapid technological developments have brought new chal-
lenges for the protection of personal data. The scale of data
sharing and collecting has increased dramatically. Technol-
ogy allows both private companies and public authorities
to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale
in order to pursue their activities. Individuals increasingly
make personal information available publicly and globally.
Technology has transformed both the economy and social
life.”11(p1)
In 2012, the European Commission (EC) proposed a key
reform of the EU legal framework, which led to the draft
of a new European regulation on the protection of personal
data. This regulation intends to strengthen individual rights
and tackle the challenges of globalization and new technolo-
gies (mainly on-line) by adapting the general principles which
were considered to remain valid to these challenges while
maintaining the technological neutrality of the legal frame-
work.
When it comes into force, which has become more  likely
to happen after the majority of the European Parliament
approved its draft (March 2014), the new Regulation (hence-
forward cited as “the Regulation”) will immediately become
the new general legal framework of data protection in all
member States of the EU, abolishing the long time ruling of
Directive 95/46/CE.20 The pathway to this reform was based
in several documents from different entities, some of which
included innovative mechanisms to protect personal data
against the challenges it endures at present time.38 This path-
way also included a Eurobarometer 2011 survey39 on the
attitudes towards data protection, which showed interest-
ing results and revealed that the majority of Europeans feel
obliged or are willing to give up their privacy and conﬁden-
tiality almost on a daily basis. Results of the Eurobarometer
2011 survey showed that 58% of Europeans feel that there
is no alternative other than to disclose personal informa-
tion if they want to obtain products or services; 79% of
social networking and sharing site users were likely to dis-
close their name; 51% their photo and 47% their nationality.
Online shoppers typically gave their names (90%), home
addresses (89%), and mobile phone numbers (46%). Only a
third of Europeans were aware of a national public author-
ity responsible for protecting their personal data rights (33%)
and just over a quarter of social network users (26%) and
even fewer online shoppers (18%) felt in complete control
of their data.39 Importantly, these numbers just conﬁrmed
what the European institutions already suspected. In 2010, in
a Communication to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, titled “A comprehensive approach on
personal data protection in the European Union”,40 the Com-
mission concluded that the EU needed “a more comprehensive
and coherent policy on the fundamental right to personal data
protection”.40
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The  new  general  rules  in  the  Regulation  that  can  have
impact  in  the  protection  of  health  data
The new EU strategy intends to “put individuals in control of
their own data”11 and a new approach to what is considered
“nominative data” is adopted in the Regulation. For instance,
the acts of being observed and being traced become privacy
threats, even without knowing the name of the observed or
traced person.36 Article 4/2 of the Regulation determines that
personal data “means any information relating to a data sub-
ject”. Data subject is deﬁned as “an identiﬁed natural person
or a natural person who  can be identiﬁed, directly or indirectly,
by means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by
any other natural or legal person, in particular by reference
to an identiﬁcation number, location data, online identiﬁer or
to one or more  factors speciﬁc to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that
person” (Article 2/1).
A signiﬁcant improvement is the principle of transparency
introduced by Article 5 (Principles relating to personal data
processing), which stipulates that personal data must be
“processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in
relation to the data subject” (Article 5/a).
Two other innovations in terms of data control rights are
the right to portability and the right to be forgotten. Article 18/1
of the Regulation determines that data subjects have the right
to obtain a copy of their personal data from the controller,
in a “structured and commonly used format which is com-
monly used and allows for further use by the data subject”. In
Article 18/2 it is granted to the data subject the “right to trans-
mit  personal data and any other information provided by the
data subject and retained by an automated processing system,
into another one, in an electronic format which is commonly
used, without hindrance from the controller from whom the
personal data are withdrawn”. As some authors put it, data
portability is therefore the right to “take personal data and
leave”.36 Importantly, the “right to be forgotten” (and to era-
sure) is also a new option in the Regulation and has recently
been conﬁrmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union
(Article 17)12:
“Any person should have the right to have personal data
concerning them rectiﬁed and a ‘right to be forgotten’
where the retention of such data is not in compliance with
this Regulation. In particular, data subjects should have
the right that their personal data are erased and no longer
processed, where the data are no longer necessary in rela-
tion to the purposes for which the data are collected or
otherwise processed, where data subjects have withdrawn
their consent for processing or where they object to the
processing of personal data concerning them or where the
processing of their personal data otherwise does not com-
ply with this Regulation. This right is particularly relevant,
when the data subject has given their consent as a child,
when not being fully aware of the risks involved by the
processing, and later wants to remove such personal data
especially on the Internet. However, the further retention of
the data should be allowed where it is necessary for histori-
cal, statistical and scientiﬁc research purposes, for reasons
of public interest in the area of public health, for exercising . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):123–133
the right of freedom of expression, when required by law
or where there is a reason to restrict the processing of the
data instead of erasing them.”11
In this respect, we agree with Costa and Poullet36 when
these authors afﬁrm that the effectiveness of the right to be for-
gotten relies on a techno-legal approach, as technical solutions
have to be adopted to ensure the erasure and blocking of data
on the Internet. This fact is related to another innovative rule
of the Regulation, the introduction of a “privacy-by-design”
obligation.
“Privacy-by-design” is established in Article 23 of the Regu-
lation (Data protection by design and by default) giving data
controllers the duty to “Having regard to the state of the art
and the cost of implementation (. . .)  both at the time of the
determination of the means for processing and at the time
of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and
organizational measures and procedures in such a way that
the processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation
and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject”
(Article 23/1). The European Commission is the institution
empowered to specify data protection by design requirements
“applicable across sectors, products and services” (Article
23/3).
Very important to the future of personal data protection
in general and in the ﬁeld of health and genetic data privacy
and conﬁdentiality rights, in particular, is the new approach
found in the Regulation in what refers to Responsibility and Lia-
bility. Differently from the Directive 95/46/CE, the Regulation is
very much concerned about responsibility, and clearly states
that the controllers of data are responsible to implement data
security requirements (Article 23). Importantly, the Regulation
determines a “principle of accountability” and describes in
detail the obligation of the controller to comply with the Reg-
ulation and to demonstrate this compliance, including by way
of adoption of internal policies and mechanisms for ensur-
ing such compliance.11 This is a very important step ahead
in the general protection of personal data, which can have a
huge impact on health data controllers and processors (Arti-
cle 22 on the responsibility of the controller). Furthermore, in
terms of liability, the Regulation presents two  considerable
modiﬁcations to the Directive. It makes processors (those who
process data on behalf of controllers) liable for damages and
when these are multiple it establishes a “joint liability” avoid-
ing the necessity to identify the one at fault (Articles 23 and
24). The Regulation also imposes on controllers and processors
the duty to cooperate with the supervisory authority (Article
29).
In brief, with all these new data protection enforcement
mechanisms the Regulation seems to bring the possibility of
a new era for privacy and conﬁdentiality rights and implic-
itly to health and genetic data protection. Nevertheless, in
speciﬁc terms the only innovation in the Regulation which
targets health data is Article 84, inserted in Chapter IX (Pro-
visions relating to speciﬁc data processing) on “Obligations
of secrecy”. In this disposition it is stated that within the
limits of the Regulation, Member States may adopt speciﬁc
rules (which have to be notiﬁed to the European Commis-
sion) to set out the investigative powers by the supervisory
authorities “in relation to controllers or processors that are
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ubjects under national law or rules established by national
ompetent bodies to an obligation of professional secrecy
r other equivalent obligations of secrecy, where this is
ecessary and proportionate to reconcile the right of the pro-
ection of personal data with the obligation of secrecy”.41,g
or the remaining, the Regulation maintains the concept
hat “health related data” and “genetic data” must be con-
idered as “sensitive data”, and as such require more  data
rotection safeguards. Article 9 of the Regulation11 sets out
he general prohibition for processing special categories of
ersonal data, including “data concerning health” and the
xceptions from this general rule, building on Article 8 of the
irective 95/46/EC.20 Strangely, article 81 of the Regulation
hich deﬁnes the processing of health data does not include
enetic data. The Regulation deﬁnes both “genetic data” and
data concerning health” (Article 4) but it is obvious that this
ector was not a major concern in the EU data protection
eform.
Overall, some of the new instruments proposed for a
enewed framework for data protection in Europe can give
 practical sense to the rights of privacy and conﬁdential-
ty in healthcare and genetic settings, transforming them
rom rhetorical ﬁgures into real obligations to the counter-
arts (health and genetic data controllers and processors). For
nstance, the obligation to build “privacy by design” for the
rocessing of health data or biobanks will be key for health
nformation systems’ managers. For example, in Portugal, a
omprehensive and ofﬁcial Health Data Platform42 has been
aunched without truly informing the public about health
rivacy and conﬁdentiality issues. Furthermore, there is no
ention in the Platform website to the rights of the people
ho  will be putting there their medical data lacuna, which
ould have been impossible years ago. Moreover, the National
ata Protection Commission is not referenced in the portal as
aving given its authorization to treatment of medical data at
uch an extension. We  think that when in force, the new rules
rom the EU Regulation will have a positive impact on the pri-
acy and conﬁdentiality of patients’ data, which urgently need
edemption in Portugal.
ast  word
“But someone will always have to speak for privacy,
because it doesn’t naturally rise to the top of most con-
sideration sets, whether in government or in the private
sector.”2(p126)
g This importance given to secrecy was also stressed on the
adrid Resolution, signed by the Data Protection and Privacy Com-
issioners in 2009 where on topic 13 data relating to health or sex
ife is considered “sensitive data”. In the same document, topic 21
efers to a “duty of conﬁdentiality” which states that “The respon-
ible person and those involved at any stage of the processing shall
aintain the conﬁdentiality of personal data. This obligation shall
emain even after the ending of the relationship with the data
ubject or, when appropriate, with the responsible person.” 0 1 4;3 2(2):123–133 131
“You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” This famous
1999 quote in Wiredh by Scott McNealy,27 was more  than an
epiphany as it becomes more  and more  accurate as time goes
by.
Certainly, today privacy is a deﬁed and perhaps even com-
pressed concept. Nonetheless, even those willingly sharing
their areas of reclusion take offense when seeing others
intruding those same areas without their consent. Fur-
thermore, experiencing pernicious effects related to privacy
exposure can constitute disturbing incidents, which rarely
lead to decisions of maintaining minute areas of personal
retreat. Therefore, despite its transmutations and metamor-
phosis, privacy is still part of our hardwiring as agents
endowed with free will. Hence, transformed, nuanced and
self-afﬁrmed concepts of privacy still persevere in these highly
demanding circumstances.
In a way, the facts are not suiting any data protection rights,
but the new EU regulation seems to want to protect these
rights against all odds, reinventing data protection in a mix
of a legal-technological approach. Nevertheless, we must not
be naïve, and it is important to notice that the ratio of the EU
concerns is not linked to a human rights based philosophy
or defense, but mainly to economic motives. The fundamen-
tal goal of the new EU instruments on data protection is the
“building of trust in the online environment” which is “key to
economic development as lack of trust makes consumers hes-
itate to buy online and adopt new services”.11 Novel policies on
data protection in Europe aim to avoid the risks that fear of an
uncontrolled sharing of data may slow down  the development
of innovative uses of new technologies. It is mentioned in
the explanatory memorandum of the Regulation11 that “heavy
criticism has been expressed regarding the current fragmen-
tation of personal data protection in the Union, in particular
by economic stakeholders who asked for increased legal cer-
tainty and harmonization of the rules on the protection of
personal data”. Also, the complexity of the rules on interna-
tional transfers of personal data is considered as constituting a
“substantial impediment to their operations as they regularly
need to transfer personal data from the EU to other parts of
the world”.11 Nevertheless, even when economic motivations
are driving reform, fundamental human rights to privacy and
data protection and conﬁdentiality may beneﬁt from the new
EU Regulation.
In reality, even if the erosion of the rights to privacy
and conﬁdentiality in the health care and biobanking ﬁelds
becomes clearer, the public and health professionals still
demand at least a perception of the observation of these
rights. The facts though seem to reveal an unstoppable fading
of the frontiers of private life, especially in the healthcare
domain. Clearly, many  changes occurred during the 100 years
that mediated between “The Right to Privacy” and “Imperial
Bedroom”. The birth of the portable snapshot photography
camera and later of the video camcorder, the mobile phone
industry, the mass use of computers and the dawn  of the
internet are good examples of technology-propelled social
h Wired is a famed magazine on scientiﬁc innovations and their
impact in society, also known for featuring editorials from industry
leaders.
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transformations that provide a challenge to classical construc-
tions of individual rights and freedoms. However, despite all
these transformations the essential dimension of individual
freedom relating to personal information and to the notion
that the less is known about us the freer we  all are is still very
relevant and well grounded. In terms of our individual selves,
fears of invasion of our most private lives remain justiﬁed and
perhaps even further, as more  and more  information is known
and shared about us, using a multitude of different com-
munication channels. As far as our collective selves go, our
social tolerance towards information dissemination and data
sharing is also increasing in tandem with the expansion of
phenomena such as social media and online social networks.
Therefore, individuals and society in general seem now more
willing to accept a level of information disclosure far higher
than before. As more  and more  is known and shared about
us the more  we  tend to cherish whatever part of us is left
uninvaded. Not surprisingly, fourteen years on since Jonathan
Franzen’s New Yorker essay, discussion around the issues of
privacy protection and conﬁdentiality breaching are undoubt-
edly as prominent as ever. This urge comes perhaps from the
utilitarianism of our times, which overthrows the worries of
public authorities and private corporations with individual
privacy and conﬁdentiality and data protection rights in
healthcare and genetics. Because economics is getting the
last word, expensive rights can soon vanish from the Law.
Consequently, we  think the rights to privacy and conﬁ-
dentiality have to be reframed in the context of Health Law
and Bioethics and be seen more  as data protection rights and
less as mere  reﬂections of the Hippocratic Oath. Silence is no
longer enough to protect our personal health information. On
the contrary, information technologies built to protect medi-
cal and genetic privacy can perform this role, but Law has to
provide obligations and sanctions to make these enforceable.
As long as top administrators and IT professionals working in
healthcare units and biobanks are not heavily sanctioned for
lack of compliance with data protection legal requirements
the rights to privacy and conﬁdentiality in these settings will
still be menaced.
We are watching, at least in Europe, an unacceptable
regression of particularly important individual rights. For this
reason, as health legal and ethical experts we express the
urgent need to update the discussion on the rights to health
data privacy and conﬁdentiality and to make sure we  will keep
these issues alive in contemporary Health Law.
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